“We are taking action by having them here in Kenya and being subjected to our laws and measures that are there to protect our children,” – ICT CS, Hon. Kabogo
Recently, Kenya’s ICT Cabinet Secretary William Kabogo appeared before the Senate and delivered an ultimatum to X: establish a physical office in Kenya within three months or lose operating approval in the country. The directive extends to TikTok and Meta and grants the Communications Authority of Kenya new powers to suspend non-compliant platforms entirely.
CS Kabogo framed the move as a child protection measure. “We are taking action by having them here in Kenya and being subjected to our laws and measures that are there to protect our children,” he told senators. The official narrative is of an assertive government finally demanding accountability from tech giants that have long operated remotely, beyond local legal reach.
The reality is more complicated and the stakes, for digital rights advocates, are high. A local office would mean local staff, local assets, and local legal exposure. That transforms the government’s leverage from diplomatic to direct. Instead of routing content removal requests through international legal channels which are often slow, and unsuccessful, Kenyan authorities could issue orders to employees on the ground, threaten personal liability, or use compliance procedures to demand takedowns quietly and quickly.
Nigeria is the instructive precedent. After a seven-month suspension of Twitter in 2021, X eventually established a legal presence in Nigeria under regulatory pressure. Kenya has now built the same architecture. The Communications Authority’s newly granted suspension powers give the government a credible off-switch, and with it, real leverage over what X does and does not act on.
The child protection framing is not entirely cynical. Deepfakes, cyberbullying, and the exploitation of minors online are genuine and growing problems. But Kenya’s government has consistently weaponized digital regulation against civil society, and that history cannot be set aside when evaluating this directive.
During the 2024 Gen Z protests, when young Kenyans mobilized online and offline against the Finance Bill, the government shut down internet access entirely. Multiple human rights organizations, including Amnesty International Kenya, Access Now, ICJ Kenya, and the #KeepItOn Coalition, condemned the shutdown as an unconstitutional violation of freedom of expression and access to information.
In 2022, Twitter suspended 22 accounts that had participated in the #NjaaRevolution campaign protesting rising food prices without explanation, during a critical pre-election period. Civil society organizations raised concerns that those suspensions amounted to censorship at a politically sensitive moment.
And while the Court of Appeal struck down Sections 22 and 23 of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act in March 2026, the provisions that criminalized “false or misleading information” online, the Law Society of Kenya and digital rights groups have now taken that fight to the Supreme Court, because the broader surveillance provisions of the Act remain intact and in use.
These readings are not mutually exclusive. A directive can simultaneously be a reasonable exercise of regulatory sovereignty and a tool for political control. The question is which impulse will dominate and the answer depends entirely on what conditions are attached to X’s local presence, and whether civil society has any meaningful say in those conditions.
The petition X should already be responding to;
Amnesty International Kenya has an active petition demanding that X overhauls its approach to the Kenyan market, one that predates and is directly relevant to this new regulatory moment. The petition documents that since mid-2024, Kenyan security agencies have carried out arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and unlawful killings targeting peaceful protesters. Coordinated troll operations, including state-linked networks such as the “527 bloggers” have been used to smear young people as “foreign agents” or “paid activists,” creating fear and silencing dissent online, while X has failed to prevent this coordinated inauthentic behaviour.
The petition’s demands expose the core irony of the government’s directive. The Kenyan state is demanding X become more accountable to the state. We are demanding X be more accountable to users, particularly the young activists who have faced coordinated harassment, doxxing, and smear campaigns run through X with apparent impunity.
A local office accountable to the Communications Authority but not to an independent oversight body does not solve the problem. It may make it worse: more efficient government reach into the platform, without any corresponding improvement in protections for those the platform is being weaponised against.
There is a distinction the government has not made: accountability to users and to human rights standards is different from accountability to state regulators. The two can point in opposite directions. Genuine accountability would involve independent oversight of any compliance conditions attached to X’s local licence; transparent reporting on government content removal requests; a functional appeals process for suspended accounts; and a commitment to human rights due diligence that includes protecting activists, not just shielding the government from criticism. None of those conditions are currently part of the directive. Kabogo’s framing, protect children, comply with local laws, leaves ample room for the government to use its new leverage against exactly the populations it claims to be protecting.
The directive to X is not straightforwardly bad policy. Platform accountability is a legitimate goal. But in Kenya, with 2027 approaching, a government with a documented history of using digital regulation as a political tool, and an active petition documenting state-linked harassment of young activists on X, the child protection framing deserves scrutiny. The question to watch is what conditions are attached, who oversees compliance, and whether civil society has any seat at that table. A local office without independent accountability protects the state. It does not protect Kenyans.
Sign our petition here to demand accountability from X